Community Proposal for the Annual Treasury Tranche Release of DIA DAO (2026) II

Discussion
1

Community Treasury and Airdrop Proposal

91,500 DIA for Lasernet Users

This proposal requests approval from the DIA DAO to distribute ninety one thousand five hundred DIA to users who interacted with the Lasernet network before this proposal was published. The goal is to reward users who provided real support to DIA through measurable onchain activity. These actions strengthened DIA Lumina and increased activity on Lasernet.

This proposal also includes strong anti sybil rules and team wallet exclusion rules. The proposal follows all governance guidelines.

Background

Lasernet activity supported DIA during the early phase of the trustless architecture rollout. Users who staked or bridged on Lasernet helped secure the network and stress test data flows. These actions created reliable activity that supported the expansion of DIA feeds across chains.

Past voting based airdrops encouraged low value behaviour. Users created many wallets and voted to farm tokens. This resulted in large rewards for low participation. Onchain activity shows real engagement. It cannot be faked at scale.

This proposal directs rewards toward users who added value to the network. It creates a clear standard for fairness, transparency, and real contribution.

Airdrop Amount

Total allocation: 91,500

Eligibility Criteria

A wallet qualifies only if it meets at least one condition before the proposal date.

• A cumulative bridge volume of 200 DIA or more through official Lasernet bridge routes

• A staking amount of 200 DIA or more on Lasernet

• A verifiable onchain interaction with Lasernet contracts that meets the minimum thresholds above

These thresholds reduce low effort actions. They prevent users from bridging or staking small amounts across many wallets. The 200 DIA minimum makes sybil attacks costly.

Anti Sybil Rules

This proposal uses clear filters.

• Wallets with less than 200 DIA bridged are excluded

• Wallets with less than 200 DIA staked are excluded

• Wallets that show activity after the proposal date are excluded

• Wallets created after the proposal announcement are excluded

These rules prevent reward farming. The cost of creating several wallets and funding each with 200 DIA is high. This makes multi wallet abuse unlikely.

Team Wallet Exclusion

The DIA team used wallets for testing, deployment, and internal operations. These wallets are not eligible. They will be excluded through the following steps.

• The DIA team provides a list of testing and operational wallets

• These wallets are removed before final verification

• Any wallet with deployment signatures or contract ownership activity is also removed

This ensures that no internal wallet receives rewards.

Data Based Eligibility

Eligibility will be verified with the following process.

  1. Collect all wallets that interacted with Lasernet bridge and staking contracts

  2. Filter by minimum 200 DIA threshold

  3. Remove internal team wallets

  4. Count the remaining wallets

The reward per wallet equals 91,500 DIA divided by the total number of eligible wallets.

91,500 / x=Number of eligible wallets

This process ensures that rewards remain meaningful and not symbolic. It also proves that the airdrop is manageable and aligned with the treasury plan.

Distribution Method

• Every eligible wallet receives an equal share

• Data is collected through onchain contract queries

• The eligibility list is verified and published

• A claim page is deployed for users to receive the airdrop

Rationale

This proposal rewards real activity inside the DIA ecosystem. It supports decentralisation through measurable onchain participation. It reduces sybil behaviour through threshold based filters. It avoids the abuse seen in snapshot voting events. It also aligns the community with the long term goals of DIA Lumina and Lasernet.

This approach builds trust. It ensures fair distribution. It recognises the users who strengthened the network during its early stages.

After the 91500 airdrop allocation, the remaining treasury allocation follows as outlined in the core team proposal.

Implementation Timeline

• Collection and verification of eligible wallets

• Publication of the final list

• Launch of the claim page

• Completion of the airdrop

Final Note

This proposal improves fairness in airdrop distribution. It rewards users who provided measurable support to Lasernet and DIA Lumina. It protects the system from sybil actions. It ensures that rewards reach real contributors.

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Thank you @Hypolithe for refining your proposal and addressing the anti-Sybil mechanisms and team wallet exclusion criteria. We appreciate the effort put into creating a more robust framework.

However, as outlined in my response to the first community proposal, the core team does not support an airdrop at this stage.

While Lasernet activity demonstrates genuine ecosystem engagement, we have concerns about rewarding this specific activity type. Stakers already earn competitive APY (~14.68%), making additional incentives on top of existing rewards redundant. Bridging activity, while valuable for user experience, doesn’t directly contribute to network security or oracle performance in the way that staking does.

We believe treasury resources are better allocated toward initiatives that create long-term strategic value rather than retroactive airdrops for activities that are either already incentivized (staking) or don’t directly strengthen DIA’s core infrastructure (bridging).

That said, all proposals meeting governance guidelines will be included in the Snapshot vote. The community will ultimately decide, and we respect whatever outcome the DAO chooses.

Thanks for your continued engagement in DIA governance.

Best regards,
Anze, Community & DAO Lead at DIA

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3

Hello everyone,

While I appreciate the intention behind rewarding early Lasernet users, I must highlight several critical concerns that make it impossible for me and for the community I represent to support this airdrop at this time.

  1. We do not know how many users are actually eligible?

The proposal relies on eligibility criteria that have never been quantified:

  • We do not know the number of wallets with ≥200 DIA bridged

  • We do not know the number of wallets with ≥200 DIA staked

  • We do not know how many wallets are non-team, non-sybil, and meet the thresholds

  • Or how many wallets staked for a short period, then withdrew immediately? Some repeatedly bridged small amounts simply to trigger contract interactions, others only engaged once, months ago, with no continuity

Because of this, the total number of eligible participants could be extremely small, based on existing Lasernet activity.

This creates a major structural problem:

:right_arrow: A tiny group would receive a disproportionately large payout from the treasury
:right_arrow: These users have already earned APY from staking, meaning they are double-rewarded
:right_arrow: The majority of the community receives nothing, including long-term voters and supporters

This is neither equitable nor aligned with DIA’s long-term strategic direction.

  1. The proposal does not justify the 91,500 DIA cost

Based on the real level of Lasernet activity and onchain engagement, this airdrop does not merit a 91,500 DIA allocation.

A reward of this size should reflect:

  • significant contributions,

  • broad community participation,

  • multi-year engagement, and

  • measurable ecosystem expansion.

The described interactions (bridge + staking) do not deliver value proportional to such a large treasury expenditure.

:right_arrow: The cost far exceeds the impact.

Additional note on the proposal:

It seems there is a sense of urgency to push for an airdrop, perhaps more for the sake of having one than for carefully designing a fair, sustainable distribution. While every community member is free to vote as they wish, we must recognize that if the outcome will show only a very small number of eligible participants, the airdrop would contradict the core values of DIA and DAO governance. In such a case, the proposal would naturally be cancelled to preserve fairness, proportionality, and alignment with long-term community interests.

Both DIA Lumina and Lasernet have been live for less than 9 months. Their short operational history means that on-chain activity so far cannot be considered a reliable measure of sustained contribution or long-term alignment with the DIA ecosystem. Distributing an airdrop at this stage risks rewarding opportunistic or short-term behavior rather than genuine engagement that supports network growth.

This underscores the broader point: DAO treasury allocations must be data-driven, transparent, and tied to measurable, sustained contributions , not rushed simply to execute an airdrop

Highlighting the importance of data-driven decision making in DAOs: eligibility, contribution, and community alignment should always guide token distribution, not merely the desire to execute an airdrop.

Regards,

Alex

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4

Thank you for the detailed points, Alex and Anze. I will address them clearly so the community understands why this proposal went up.

Firstly i support the team’s proposal fully. This airdrop framework only applies if the community decides to vote for an airdrop. In that situation, I want the right users rewarded, not sybil farms.

  1. Eligibility are now defined and measurable.

These thresholds remove inactive users, remove test accounts, and remove sybil setups. This ensures that only real users with real network involvement enter the list.

  1. The number of eligible users will be clear
    On chain queries will produce the exact counts.

Nothing stays unknown. Everything is verifiable. The community gets a clean dataset before any vote proceeds.

  1. A small user base does not mean the proposal is unfair
    Lasernet is under 9 months old. Early users engaged when activity was low and risk was higher. They provided traction at a stage when adoption was uncertain. APY is yield for staking. Early participation was contribution. These are different and should be treated as different.

Rewarding early contributors is not double paying. It acknowledges users who helped the network bootstrap.

  1. Treasury impact is controlled
    The allocation is fixed at 91,500 DIA which is 10% of the requested amount. It is targeted. It does not interfere with long term plans. It does not dilute broader strategic spending. It applies only if the community votes for an airdrop.

The proposal does not force an airdrop. It only sets rules so that if the community wants it, the distribution is clean and fair.

  1. There was no rush and no urgency
    The goal was clarity. If there is an airdrop vote, the distribution should not go to sybil farms and random wallets. It should go to users with real economic involvement. The proposal gives structure. Without structure, the process is broken.

This keeps the ecosystem aligned with fairness and verifiable contribution.

To the community members who want an airdrop, this framework protects you from a sybil dominated outcome. To the members who support the team proposal, this framework does not interfere with it.

5

The proposal was added to the Snapshot vote and is labeled under “Community Proposal #2”.

The Snapshot vote is now live.

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